1
Introduction
▶
Zero knowledge from garbled circuits
What the protocol is for
No claim of originality
Contents
The model
Related work
How this library was written
2
Message order and the security it gives
▶
2.1
The protocol in order
2.2
When the witness bits are fixed: static or adaptive authenticity
2.3
When the garbling is opened: honest or malicious verifier
2.4
How the commitment and the oblivious transfer are realized
2.5
When parties are corrupted
2.6
Summary
3
Privacy-free Free-XOR garbling
▶
3.1
Circuits and plaintext evaluation
3.2
Garbling and evaluation
3.3
Correctness
4
The protocol of Jawurek, Kerschbaum and Orlandi
▶
4.1
The model
4.2
Completeness, zero knowledge, soundness
4.3
Without the opening
5
Authenticity: where \(\Delta \) enters the view
▶
5.1
The ideal garbler
5.2
The bound in the ideal model
6
Authenticity in the random oracle model
▶
6.1
The trace of the garbler
6.2
Adversaries and the two games
6.3
The reduction
6.4
The real garbling
7
A hash commitment instead of the ideal one
▶
7.1
Oracle runs
7.2
Zero knowledge
7.3
Soundness
7.4
End-to-end soundness
8
A real oblivious transfer: zero knowledge
▶
8.1
The oblivious transfer
8.2
Zero knowledge
8.3
Sender security: the square Diffie–Hellman reduction
9
A real oblivious transfer: the dual-mode OT of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters
▶
9.1
The dual-mode cryptosystem
9.2
Soundness
9.3
Zero knowledge
9.4
The two modes and DDH
10
Adaptive authenticity
▶
10.1
The game
10.2
The simulated game
10.3
The real game without bad queries
10.4
Bad queries
11
Soundness with the Chou–Orlandi OT
▶
11.1
The game
11.2
The OT layer
11.3
Both key points
12
Ingredients for adaptive corruptions
▶
12.1
The equivocation condition for the receiver
12.2
Explaining the prover
12.3
Equivocating the hash commitment
12.4
Soundness in decryption mode
13
Cut-and-choose against a malicious garbler
▶
13.1
Copies of a garbling
14
What is not formalized
Dependency graph
Zero knowledge from privacy-free garbled circuits
glaroton
1
Introduction
Zero knowledge from garbled circuits
What the protocol is for
No claim of originality
Contents
The model
Related work
How this library was written
2
Message order and the security it gives
2.1
The protocol in order
2.2
When the witness bits are fixed: static or adaptive authenticity
2.3
When the garbling is opened: honest or malicious verifier
2.4
How the commitment and the oblivious transfer are realized
2.5
When parties are corrupted
2.6
Summary
3
Privacy-free Free-XOR garbling
3.1
Circuits and plaintext evaluation
3.2
Garbling and evaluation
3.3
Correctness
4
The protocol of Jawurek, Kerschbaum and Orlandi
4.1
The model
4.2
Completeness, zero knowledge, soundness
4.3
Without the opening
5
Authenticity: where \(\Delta \) enters the view
5.1
The ideal garbler
5.2
The bound in the ideal model
6
Authenticity in the random oracle model
6.1
The trace of the garbler
6.2
Adversaries and the two games
6.3
The reduction
6.4
The real garbling
7
A hash commitment instead of the ideal one
7.1
Oracle runs
7.2
Zero knowledge
7.3
Soundness
7.4
End-to-end soundness
8
A real oblivious transfer: zero knowledge
8.1
The oblivious transfer
8.2
Zero knowledge
8.3
Sender security: the square Diffie–Hellman reduction
9
A real oblivious transfer: the dual-mode OT of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters
9.1
The dual-mode cryptosystem
9.2
Soundness
9.3
Zero knowledge
9.4
The two modes and DDH
10
Adaptive authenticity
10.1
The game
10.2
The simulated game
10.3
The real game without bad queries
10.4
Bad queries
11
Soundness with the Chou–Orlandi OT
11.1
The game
11.2
The OT layer
11.3
Both key points
12
Ingredients for adaptive corruptions
12.1
The equivocation condition for the receiver
12.2
Explaining the prover
12.3
Equivocating the hash commitment
12.4
Soundness in decryption mode
13
Cut-and-choose against a malicious garbler
13.1
Copies of a garbling
14
What is not formalized